PROJECT TITLE :

Comparing Centralized and Decentralized Contract Design Enabling Direct Load Control for Reserves

ABSTRACT:

Demand response might provide reserves to power systems and market designs ought to enable cost-efficient exploitation of these resources. In direct load control programs, shoppers offer demand response in exchange for incentive payments. The success of such contracts is a function of level of data sharing, client costs, and power system constraints/prices. In this paper, we have a tendency to compare three approaches to contract style, every of that assumes totally different levels of shopper privacy. Our aim is to explore tradeoffs between privacy, resource exploitation, and also the reward earned by the load aggregator. The primary approach assumes full and truthful data exchange between the patron and therefore the system operator. We have a tendency to then develop a completely unique centralized approach in which an aggregator applies mechanism style to supply contracts to customers who reveal partial cost information. A unique decentralized approach is developed in which shoppers act cooperatively to pool demand response reserves, enabling them to stay individual value data private. Through simulation studies, we realize that, within the centralized approach, resource exploitation/rewards are highly sensitive to the accuracy of the load aggregator's client cost curves approximations. We tend to conjointly find that in the decentralized approach, rewards will be tiny, particularly if data exchange is costly.