PROJECT TITLE :

Strategic Offering for a Price-Maker Wind Power Producer in Oligopoly Markets Considering Demand Response Exchange

ABSTRACT:

This paper proposes an giving strategy for a wind power producer (WPP) that participates in both day-ahead (DA) and balancing oligopoly markets as a value maker. Penetration of demand response (DR) resources into good grids is modeled by intraday demand response exchange (IDRX) architecture. A bilevel optimization framework is proposed based on multiagent system and incomplete data game theory. Modeling the WPPs in high penetration of wind power as worth manufacturers can mirror the potential of this market player to directly affect the market prices. Simulation results indicate that the value-taker model of WPP isn't accurate for WPPs that have significant market shares. By comparing the results obtained from modeling the WPPs as value makers with those as value takers, it will be concluded that WPPs have the market power not solely to increase the prices of both DA and balancing markets, but conjointly to reduce the amount of DR through IDRX market mechanism.