PROJECT TITLE :

Risk-Sensitive Control Under Markov Modulated Denial-of-Service (DoS) Attack Strategies

ABSTRACT:

We have a tendency to consider the problem of risk-sensitive stochastic management below a Markov modulated denial-of-service (DoS) attack strategy in that the attacker, employing a hidden Markov model, stochastically jams the control packets within the system. For a discrete-time partially observed stochastic system with an exponential running value, we have a tendency to give a answer in terms of the finite-dimensional dynamics of the system through a chain of measure transformation techniques. We have a tendency to additionally prove a separation principle below which a recursive optimal management policy along with a newly outlined info-state constitutes constant fully observable stochastic control problem. Remarkably, on the transformed live house, the answer to the optimal control problem appears as if it depends solely on the sample-path (or path-estimation) of the DoS attack sequences within the system.