PROJECT TITLE :

Generic model of aircraft susceptibility to radar under conditions of electronic counter measures

ABSTRACT:

This paper is only concerned with the susceptibility. Susceptibility of an aircraft is influenced by the subsequent factors: 1) the location, variety, and capabilities of the enemy air defense weapons; two) the aircraft's basic style (e.g., geometric form and the use of radar absorbing materials to degrade the enemy's radar detection capabilities and speed or agility to avoid any approaching enemy missiles) and onboard equipment or weapons (e.g., the employment of onboard electronic attack equipment to degrade enemy missile steering systems and antiradiation missile (ARM) to destroy the enemy air defense systems); three) the tactics that are utilized by the pilot. We can't “management” the situation, range, and capabilities of the enemy weapons. Once the aircraft enters the service, its basic design cannot be changed any more. For the aircraft in service, its susceptibility can be further reduced by adding a lot of advanced onboard equipment or weapons and using more versatile techniques. The advanced aircraft in development (e.g., the fifth generation fighter aircraft) could exhibit a lower degree of susceptibility after they initial enter the service, however, this superiority will be gradually eliminatedby proliferating threats [four]. The most advanced aircraft today also face the problem of reducing their susceptibility in the longer term. We present a generic model to realize insight into how electronic counter measures (ECMs) affect the susceptibility of aircraft. Our main purpose is to reduce the susceptibility of the aircraft in service, by applying airborne ECM techniques. Although some advanced stealth aircraft have been place into service in some countries, more aircraft in service don't seem to be stealthy, particularly in developing countries. Compared with stealth coating and other techniques, ECMs have some blessings in reducing the susceptibility of aircraft in service. For example, the stealth coating is often sensitive to the radar frequency, and the maintenance cost of the st- alth coating could be too high for a few aircraft [5]. Shaping the surface of the aircraft to obtain a smaller radar cross section (RCS) worth may be effective to decrease monostatic radar's returns, but this does not apply to bistatic radar [half-dozen]. Moreover, it's almost impossible to change the geometric form of the prevailing aircraft.