PROJECT TITLE :

Market Mechanisms for Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) - 2018

ABSTRACT:

This Project applies basic market-based approaches to the matter of (wireless) spectrum sharing between a licensed primary user (PU) and an unlicensed secondary user (SU). We think about each orthogonal and non-orthogonal modes of dynamic spectrum access (DSA), and explore rates and profits at market equilibrium. Our analytical formulation is distinct from prior art: we have a tendency to assume that one) PU increases its transmit power (among bounds) to avoid any rate loss from DSA and 2) the spectrum owner provides compensation to precisely offset PU's increased power prices, leaving PU's overall economic well-being unaffected by DSA. This permits quantification of the marginal prices for varied DSA schemes for honest comparison and insights into corresponding market behavior. Our analysis suggests that non-orthogonal DSA is additional profitable when 1) spectrum homeowners face low competition; a pair of) SU is terribly sensitive to power consumption however not terribly sensitive to knowledge rates (low or moderate rate applications); and three) channel conditions imply low mutual interference between PU and SU; otherwise, orthogonal DSA is additional profitable. Market competition contains a very giant impact on profits and rates below non-orthogonal DSA but not for orthogonal DSA. Finally, we tend to explore a unique hybrid approach where some portion of the licensed bandwidth is reserved for PU's exclusive use and non-orthogonal DSA is permitted over the rest, we tend to confirm bounds on how much bandwidth should be reserved for PU in such cases.