PROJECT TITLE:

Authenticated Key Exchange Protocols for Parallel Network File Systems - 2015

ABSTRACT:

We have a tendency to study the problem of key institution for secure several-to-several communications. The problem is galvanized by the proliferation of huge-scale distributed file systems supporting parallel access to multiple storage devices. Our work focuses on the current Internet commonplace for such file systems, i.e., parallel Network File System (pNFS), which makes use of Kerberos to ascertain parallel session keys between clients and storage devices. Our review of the prevailing Kerberos-based protocol shows that it's a number of limitations: (i) a metadata server facilitating key exchange between the clients and the storage devices has heavy workload that restricts the scalability of the protocol; (ii) the protocol will not provide forward secrecy; (iii) the metadata server generates itself all the session keys that are used between the purchasers and storage devices, and this inherently ends up in key escrow. In this paper, we propose a variety of authenticated key exchange protocols that are designed to handle the higher than issues. We show that our protocols are capable of reducing up to approximately fifty four p.c of the workload of the metadata server and concurrently supporting forward secrecy and escrow-freeness. All this needs solely a little fraction of increased computation overhead at the client.