PROJECT TITLE :

Incentivizing Wi-Fi Network Crowdsourcing: A Contract Theoretic Approach - 2018

ABSTRACT:

Crowdsourced wireless community network enables the individual users to share their non-public Wi-Fi access points (APs) with each different, hence it will achieve a massive Wi-Fi coverage with a tiny deployment cost via crowdsourcing. This Project presents a unique contract-primarily based incentive framework to incentivize such a Wi-Fi network crowdsourcing under incomplete data (where each user has bound private info like mobility pattern and Wi-Fi access quality). Within the proposed framework, the network operator designs and offers a group of contract items to users, each consisting of a Wi-Fi access worth (that a user will charge others for accessing his AP) and a subscription fee (that a user wants to pay the operator for joining the community). Different from the existing contracts in the literature, in our contract model, every user's best selection depends not only on his non-public information however conjointly on other user's selections. This greatly complicates the contract style, as the operator wants to research the equilibrium choices of all users, rather than the most effective selection of each single user. We have a tendency to 1st derive the possible contract that guarantees the user's truthful data disclosure based on the equilibrium analysis of the user selection, and then derive the optimal (and feasible) contract that yields a maximal profit for the operator. Our analysis shows that a user who provides a higher Wi-Fi access quality is more doubtless to settle on a higher Wi-Fi access value and subscription fee, no matter the user mobility pattern. Simulation results more show that when increasing the average Wi-Fi access quality of users, the operator will gain additional profit, but (counter-intuitively) supply lower Wi-Fi access costs and subscription fees for users.