PROJECT TITLE :

Architectural Protection of Application Privacy against Software and Physical Attacks in Untrusted Cloud Environment - 2018

ABSTRACT:

In cloud computing, it is usually assumed that cloud vendors are trusted; the guest Operating System (OS) and also the Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM, additionally called Hypervisor) are secure. But, these assumptions don't seem to be continually true in follow and existing approaches cannot protect the information privacy of applications when none of these parties are trusted. We have a tendency to investigate how to deal with a robust threat model that is that the cloud vendors, the guest OS, or the VMM, or each of them are malicious or untrusted, and will launch attacks against privacy of trusted user applications. This model has relevancy as a result of applications may be tiny enough to be formally verified, while the guest OS and VMM are too complex to be formally verified. Specifically, we gift the design and analysis of an architectural solution that integrates a set of elements on-chip to shield the memory of trusted applications from potential software and hardware primarily based attacks from untrusted cloud providers, compromised guest OS, or malicious VMM. Full-system performance evaluation results show that the design solely incurs 9 % overhead on average, that is a little performance price that is got the substantial security gain.