PROJECT TITLE :

Modeling Enlargement Attacks Against UWB Distance Bounding Protocols

ABSTRACT:

Distance bounding protocols create it possible to see a trusted higher sure on the gap between two devices. Their key property is to resist reduction attacks, i.e., attacks aimed toward reducing the distance measured by the protocol. Recently, researchers have conjointly centered on enlargement attacks, aimed toward enlarging the measured distance. Providing security against such attacks is very important for secure positioning techniques. The contribution of this paper is to produce a probabilistic model for the success of an enlargement attack against a distance bounding protocol realized with the IEEE 802.15.4a ultra-wideband commonplace. The model captures many variables, like the propagation setting, the signal-to-noise ratio, and also the time-of-arrival estimation algorithm. We tend to focus on non-coherent receivers, which can be employed in low-price low-power applications. We tend to validate our model by comparison with physical-layer simulations and goodness-of-match tests. The results show that our probabilistic model is sufficiently realistic to switch physical-layer simulations. Our model will be used to evaluate the security of the ranging/positioning solutions that can be subject to enlargement attacks. We have a tendency to expect that it can considerably facilitate future research on secure ranging and secure positioning.