PROJECT TITLE :

Renewables and Storage in Distribution Systems: Centralized vs. Decentralized Integration

ABSTRACT:

The matter of integrating renewables and storage into a distribution network is taken into account underneath two integration models: 1) a centralized model involving a retail utility that owns the integration as half of its portfolio of energy resources, and a pair of) a decentralized model in that every client individually owns and operates the combination and is capable of selling surplus electricity back to the retailer in a very internet-metering setting. The 2 integration models are analyzed using a Stackelberg game in that the utility is that the leader in setting the retail price of electricity, and each client schedules its demand by maximizing individual client surplus. The solution of the Stackelberg game defines the Pareto front that characterizes basic tradeoffs between retail profit of the utility and consumer surplus. It's shown that, for each integration models, the centralized integration uniformly improves retail profit. As the amount of integration will increase, the proportion of benefits goes to the shoppers increases. In distinction, the patron-primarily based decentralized integration improves consumer surplus at the expense of retail profit of the utility. For a profit regulated utility, the consumer-based integration could cause smaller shopper surplus than that when no renewable or storage is integrated at either the consumer or the retailer finish.